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NOTE 
NOWHERE TO RUN ... 
NOWHERE TO HIDE: 
TRADEMARK HOLDERS 
REIGN SUPREME IN 
PANAVISION INT'L, L.P. 
v. TOEPPEN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is viewed as "a worldwide network of comput-
ers that enables individuals and organizations to share infor-
mation."l In order for the Internet to operate as a communica-
tions medium for its users, every computer linked to the Inter-
net must have a numeric address that can be identified and 
located by other users.2 The numeric Internet address func-
tions like a street address or a telephone number and enables 
other computers on the network to locate and route messages 
to that address.3 The numeric address is assigned an alpha-
betical counterpart referred to as a "domain name" because 
1. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). (hereinaf-
ter Panavision II). 
2. See Ian N. Feinberg and Janet M. Craycroft, TradeTrUlrk Protection on the Inter-
net and Other Legal Issues, PRAGrICING LAw INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAw AND PRAGrICE 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, p. 666 (Sept. 17, 1997). 
3. See id. at 667. The Internet numeric address is called an IP (i.e. Internet Proto-
col) address and is expressed numerically, e.g., 820.81.1111.37. 
1 
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users can more easily remember an Internet address by a 
name.4 
A domain name is the simplest way to locate a web site.5 
Users looking for a particular site who do not know the site's 
domain name can use an Internet "search engine" much like 
using a phone book to find a person's phone number.6 Indi-
viduals and companies prefer to have a recognizable domain 
name so that users can more easily find their web sites. An 
entity's domain name often includes its own name or a recog-
nizable, abbreviated form of its name. 7 For example, typing 
www ibm com into a web browser is the quickest, easiest, and 
most reliable way to find IBM's web page because merely typ-
ing "IBM" into an Internet search engine is likely to tum up 
not only the page sought, but several thousand others as well. 8 
No two domains can have the same name, for the same rea-
son that no two telephone lines can have the same number. A 
problem arises from the fact that all of the companies around 
the world must register their domain name within a limited 
number of top-level domain categories. 9 Therefore, there is a 
limited choice of domain names. Since the establishment of the 
Internet, conflicts have arisen regarding trademark law and 
4. Typically, e-mail addresses on the Internet are routed using addresses having a 
form such as jruiz@hotmail.com. The part of the address after the"@" sign is the do-
main name. The domain name is a unique identifier, which designates a set of com-
puters on the Internet, at which the specific address receives and sends e-mail mes-
sages. See id .. 
5. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1319. 
6. See id. To do this, the user types in a key word search, and the search will lo-
cate all of the web sites containing the key word. Key word searches can yield hun-
dreds of web sites. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997). 
7. E.g., ibm.com is IBM's domain name. See http://www.ibm.com. 
8. See Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the 
Twenty-First Century, 66 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 385 (Winter 1998). Search engines search 
the Internet using "key words" selected by the searching party. A key word search will 
typically produce a list of web sites that use the key words. The length and success of 
this process is dependent upon the searching party's ability to deduce the correct key 
word or words and the number of other web sites that use the same key words. 
9. Domain names typically are comprised of an abbreviation, name or acronym, 
followed by a period and one of five world-wide generic top level domain categories 
(.com for commercial entities, .edu for educational institutions, .org for non-profit or-
ganizations, .gov for government entities, and .net for Internet providers) or country 
code domains (such as .ca for Canada or .au for Australia). See generally, 
www.internic.net. 
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the use of similar, or the same, domain names by more than 
one person. 10 These disputes surface mainly when a trademark 
owner challenges the right of a domain name holder to use a 
name identical to its registered trademark. 11 
Panavision, a Delaware corporation that is involved with 
the motion picture industry, holds registered trademarks to the 
name "Panavision. "12 In December 1995, Panavision sought to 
register the Internet domain name of Panavision.com with 
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI).13 NSI would not register the 
domain name to Panavision because an individual, Dennis To-
eppen, previously established a web site using Panavision's 
trademark as his domain name. 14 
Panavision sent Toeppen a cease and desist letter15 ordering 
him to stop using its registered trademark as a domain name. 16 
Toeppen offered to settle the matter by selling Panavision the 
domain name for $13,000.17 Concluding Toeppen was a "cyber 
pirate," Panavision refused to settle. 18 Instead, Panavision 
10. See Feinberg and Craycroft, supra note 2, at 666. 
11. See itt. Trademark rights typically are recognized in a narrow class of goods. 
Different companies therefore may hold similar marks in different industries. For 
example, "DeltaD is the trade name used by an airline and the manufacturer of house· 
hold faucets. If Delta Airlines selected the domain name delta. com it would block the 
faucet manufacturer from using its trade name as its domain name, but would not 
have committed trademark infringement. See, e.g., The Emerging Law of the Internet, 
LEGAL & BUSINESS ASPECTS OF THE INTENET (Law Journal Seminars, San Francisco, 
CA) Nov. 5-6, 1998, at 421. 
12. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1319. 
13. See itt. 
14. See itt. 
15. A cease and desist letter is an order of an administrative agency or court pro-
hibiting a person or business firm from continuing a particular course of conduct. E.g. 
The Federal Trade Commission may order a business to cease and desist from mis-
branding or misadvertising its products. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 223 (6th ed. 1990). 
16. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1319. 
17. See itt. The facts further stated that "Toeppen responded by mail to Panavi-
sion in California, stating he had the right to use the name Panavision.com on the 
Internet as his domain name. Additionally, Toeppen stated that if Panavision agreed 
to his offer, he would not acquire any other Internet addresses, which are alleged by 
Panavision Corporation to be its property.D See id. 
18. ,A "eyber pirateD or "cybersquatterD is someone who registers a domain name 
that includes a registered trademark of someone else, and who attempts to extract 
payment for relinquishing the domain name to the trademark holder. Hearst Corp, v. 
Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 at 18-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See also In-
termatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill. 1996). Panavision is not the first 
3
Sanford: Electronic Personal Jurisdiction
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
4 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1 
proceeded to file an action against Toeppen in Federal Court in 
California. On appeal from the court's grant of summary 
judgment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Panavision International v. Toeppen 19 addressed the 
unsettled area of Internet personal jurisdiction. The court 
found personal jurisdiction existed in a decision that conflicted 
with the Circuit's own precedent as well as decisions of other 
circuits. 
Part II of this note discusses the procedural history of 
Panavision. Part III surveys the evolving application of per-
sonal jurisdiction in the various courts as applied to the Inter-
net through minimum contacts and the Calder "effects test. "20 
Part IV outlines the Ninth Circuit's analysis of personal juris-
diction in Panavision. Part V critiques the Ninth Circuit's 
analysis, focusing particularly on several flaws in the court's 
reasoning. Part VI summarizes the effect that the decision in 
Panavision will have on future suits involving the Internet. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Panavision is a Delaware limited partnership with its prin-
cipal place of business in Los Angeles, California. 21 Panavision 
owns the federally registered trademark "Panavision" which it 
corporation to sue Toeppen for trademark infringement regarding this same activity. 
In December of 1995, Toeppen applied to register the domain name 
"www jntcrmatjc comw with NSI. Soon after, Intermatic attempted to register the same 
domain name ("intermatic.comW) but was prevented from doing so by Toeppen's prior 
registration. Intermatic brought federal and state trademark actions against Toeppen 
for his registration of its trademark as his domain name. Intermatic is a Delaware 
corporation with its principal place of business in Spring Grove, Illinois. To obtain 
jurisdiction over Toeppen, Intermatic brought its suit in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The District Court described Toeppen as a 
cybersquatter and eGioined Toeppen's use of "intermatic.com.w See also American 
Standard v. Toeppen ••• (E.D. Ill. 1996). The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Illinois enjoined Toeppen from using a domain name in American 
Standard. American Standard brought suit against Toeppen for trademark infringe· 
ment arising from Toeppen's acquisition of the "americanstandard.comW domain name. 
American Standard moved for a preliminary injunction and perhaps recognizing the 
inevitable, Toeppen consented to its entry. 
19. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
20. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
21. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F.Supp 616, 618 (C.D. Ca. 1996). 
(hereinafter Panavision D. 
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uses in connection with its motion picture and television cam-
era business. 22 
Dennis Toeppen (Toeppen), the defendant, is an individual 
residing in Illinois. 23 Toeppen owns the website "panavi-
sion.com. "24 In December 1995, Toeppen applied for registra-
tion of the Internet domain name "panavision.com" and Net-
work Solutions, Inc. (NSI) registered the domain name. 25 
NSI registers domain names on a "first come, first served" 
basis and does not and is not required to conduct any form of 
investigation into whether a specific domain name sought by a 
registrant violates the intellectual property rights of a third 
party.26 Although NSI does not make an independent determi-
nation of an applicant's right to use a domain name, NSI does 
require applicants to make certain representations and war-
ranties.27 
On May 7, 1996, Panavision, whose principal place of busi-
ness is in California, filed a federal trademark infringement 
action against Toeppen in the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California.28 Panavision claimed that 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. at 619. 
26. See Feinberg and Craycroft., supra note 2 at 669. The National Science Foun-
dation solicited bids for and entered into Cooperative Agreements with several compa-
nies to administer the Internet on behalf of the U.S. Government for the benefit of the 
public. The National Science Foundation awarded a Cooperative Agreement to Net-
work Solutions, Inc. (NSI) pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 6305, and NSI has performed do-
main name registration services since April 1, 1993. Under its initial five year contract 
to provide registration services, which has been extended beyond 1998, NSI assigns 
domain names ending on the letters ".com", ".edu", ".net", ".org", and ".gov". See id. 
27. See Panavision I, 938 F. Supp. at 619. In order to register a domain name, 
NSI requires an applicant to agree that (1) the applicant's statements in the applica-
tion are true and the applicant has the right to use the requested domain name, (2) the 
use or registration of the domain name does not interfere with or infringe the rights of 
any third party with respect to trademark, service mark, trade name, company name 
or any other intellectual property right, and (3) the applicant is not seeking to use the 
domain name for any unlawful purpose, including tortious interference with contract or 
prospective business advantage, unfair competition, injuring the reputation of another, 
or for the purpose of confusing or misleading a person, whether natural or incorpo-
rated. See id. 
28. See id. 
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Toeppen had diluted its trademark in violation of the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.29 
Toeppen fIled a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(2).30 Toeppen alleged that the district court lacked 
personal jurisdiction because he resided in Illinois and the al-
legations in the complaint arose from his activities in Illinois. 31 
The district court denied Toeppen's motion. 32 The court then 
granted summary judgment in favor of Panavision.33 Toeppen 
appealed the district court decision to the Ninth Circuit. 34 
III. BACKGROUND 
A THE FRAMEWORK FOR ExERCISING PERSONAL JURIS-
DICTION 
American jurisprudence has consistently required that be-
fore a court can adjudicate a case, the court must not only have 
29. See id. More formally known as Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, the Dilution 
Act provides that the owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the princi-
ples of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction 
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such 
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive 
quality of the mark. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c). The statute defines "dilution" as the less-
ening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, 
regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the fa-
mous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. See 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1127. 
Id. 
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). The rule provides: 
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion ... (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person. 
31. See Panavision 1,938 F. Supp at 619. 
32. See id. at 623. "The district court [found that Toeppen metl the due process 
requirements for personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the court [denied Toeppen'sl motion 
to quash the summons and dismi"ss for lack of personal jurisdiction." Id. 
33. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1318. 
34. See id. Toeppen claimed that "the district court erred in exercising personal 
jurisdiction over him because any contact he had with California was insignificant, 
emanating solely from his registration of domain names on the Internet, which he did 
in Illinois." Id. 
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subject matter jurisdiction35 over the claim, but also personal 
jurisdiction36 over the parties.37 The courts are governed by 
State long-arm statutes and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to decide when a state may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.38 State 
long-arm statutes often determine whether a court can exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Most 
states have drafted long-arm statutes to extend personal juris-
diction beyond their borders. 39 In California, the long-arm 
statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution. 40 
1. Constitutional Limits of Personal Jurisdiction 
Personal jurisdiction may be based on either general juris-
diction or specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction exists when 
a defendant is domiciled in the forum state or his activities in 
the forum state are "substantial" or "continuous and system-
atic. "41 If the defendant's contacts with the forum state are in-
sufficient to establish general jurisdiction a court can still exert 
specific jurisdiction if the defendant's activities in the forum 
are sufficient to establish jurisdiction for the purposes of the 
litigation.42 
Due Process requires that for a court to exercise specific ju-
risdiction, the defendant must have sufficient mjnjmum con-
35. Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as "Jurisdiction over the nature of the 
case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can claim to affect the 
conduct of persons or the status of things." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (6th Ed. West). 
36. A court's power to bring persons into its adjudicative process; jurisdiction over 
a defendant's personal rights, rather than merely over property interests. Id. 
37. See FREINDENTHAL et aI., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.1. (West 1991). 
38. See id. 
39. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 37, § 3.13. 
40. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1997) ("Section 410.10 permits California 
courts to exercise judicial jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the state or 
federal constitutions"). 
41. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 
(1984). 
42. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 620 (C.D. Ca. 1996). 
See also Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16. Toeppen need not have been physically 
present in the forum state for specific jurisdiction to apply. See Burger King v. Rudge-
wicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1288; California Software, 631 F. 
Supp. at 1360. 
7
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tacts with the forum state.43 Courts use the three factors of the 
minimum. contacts test, based on International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington44 and its progeny, to determine whether the exer-
cise of specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defen-
dant is proper. 45 First, the defendant must have sufficient 
"minimum. contacts" with the forum state. 46 Second, the claim 
asserted against the defendant must arise out of or be suffi-
ciently related to those contacts. 47 Third, the exercise of juris-
diction must be reasonable.48 
43. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
44. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
45. See, e.g., International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (a party foreign to a state may be 
sued if the party has "certain minimum contacts with the state such that maintenance 
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"); 
Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (the minimum contacts test requires that 
"there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections 
of its laws."); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) 
("foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction 
under the Due Process Clause"); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 
(1985) (there are five factors to consider when determining whether assertion of juris-
diction is fundamentally fair: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state's 
interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient 
and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interests the several states have 
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-113 (1987) (the mere act of placing a product into the 
stream of commerce is insufficient to fulfill the minimum contacts requirement). 
46. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92 (citing International Shoe, 
326 U.S. at 316). For a defendant to have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum 
state, a court must consider whether the defendant purposefully directed his conduct 
toward the forum state. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. This requirement "protects 
defendants from being forced to answer for their actions in a foreign jurisdiction based 
on 'random, fortuitous or attenuated' contacts." Id. The purposeful availment prong of 
the test necessitates that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state 
must be foreseeable so that the defendant reasonably anticipates being haled into 
court. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75. 
47. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. The defendant's actions must create a sub-
stantial connection with the forum state for the claim asserted against the defendant to 
arise out of or be sufficiently related to his contacts with the forum state. See id. 
When a defendant deliberately engages in significant activities within the forum state, 
or creates continuing obligations between himself and the residents of the forum, he 
has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum. See id at 474-
75. In this situation, it is not unreasonable to require the defendant to submit to the 
burdens ofiitigation in the forum state. See id at 475-76. 
48. See World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. The exercise of specific personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant must be reasonable and it cannot offend "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. 
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2. Calder v. Jones and the "Effects Test" 
In tort cases, a court may find purposeful availment based 
on the effects of an act when those effects are felt in the forum 
state.49 The United States Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones&) 
established that personal jurisdiction may be based upon "(1) 
intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) 
causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered, and which the 
defendant knows is likely to be suffered, in the forum state. "51 
This "effects test" is applied in cases involving intentional acts 
aimed at the forum state. 
In Calder, a California resident sued two Florida employees 
of the National Enquirer for defamatory statements they 
printed about the plaintiff. 52 The Court held that the focal 
point of the article, and the harm suffered, was in California, 
the place where the plaintiffs professional reputation was 
harmed. 53 The Court concluded that the defendants should 
have anticipated being haled into court in California because 
the "effects" of their tortious actions were felt in California, the 
place where the plaintiffs professional reputation as an enter-
tainer was injured. 54 
Courts have applied the Supreme Court's reasoning in Cal-
der to defamation cases involving other forms of communica-
When determining the reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction within a 
particular forum, the Ninth Circuit considered 
(1) the extent of a defendant's purposeful interjection, (2) the burden on the 
defendant in defending in the forum state, (3) the extent of conflict with the 
sovereignty of the defendant's state, (4) the forum state's interest in 
adjudicating the dispute, (5) the most judicial resolution of the controversy, (6) 
the importance of the forum state to the plaintiffs interest in convenient and 
effective relief, and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. 
Panauision II, 141 F.3d at 1323. A court must balance all seven factors to decide if 
establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant would be reasonable. See id. 
49. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984). 
50. Id. 
5!. See Calder, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
52. See id. at 785. Plaintiff brought suit against the National Enquirer, Inc., its 
local distributing company, and defendants for libel, invasion of privacy and inten-
tional infliction of emotional harm. 
53. See id. at 786. 
54. See id. at 789. 
9
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tion, such as mail, telephone and television. 55 For example, in 
Wallace v Herron,56 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit limited the use of the Calder effects test as a 
means to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 
In this case, Rod Wallace, an Indiana resident, sued a Cali-
fornia professional corporation and three California attorneys 
in Indiana for malicious prosecution. 57 The district court dis-
missed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. 58 On appeal, 
Wallace argued that the decision in Calder was analogous to 
his situation as he felt the effects of the malicious prosecution 
in Indiana.59 Therefore, the court should exercise personal ju-
risdiction over the defendant based on the Calder effects test. 60 
However, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "the plaintiffs 
reliance on Calder was misplaced. "61 The Seventh Circuit ruled 
that "the key to Calder is that the effects of an alleged inten-
tional tort are to be assessed as part of the analysis of the de-
fendant's relevant contacts with the forum. "62 The court found 
that effects alone did not end the analysis. 63 Furthermore, the 
Seventh Circuit determined that if it accepted Wallace's argu-
ment that mere effects of an intentional tort gave rise to per-
55. See e.g., Fallang v. Hickey, 40 Ohio St. 3d 106 (1988); Brown v. Flowers !dus., 
Inc., 688 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982); Casano v. WDSU-TV, 464 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1972). 
56. 778 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1985). 
57. See id. at 392. Wallace's malicious-prosecution suit is based upon a prior law-
suit in California. In the prior lawsuit, Donna and Willis Seeley sued several parties 
including Wallace. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. at 394. 
60. See id. 
61. Wallace, 778 F.2d at 394. ("We do not believe the Supreme Court in Calder 
was saying that any plaintiff may hale any defendant into court in the plaintiffs home 
state, where the defendant has no contacts, merely by asserting that the defendant has 
committed an intentional tort against the plaintiff'). 
[d. 
62. [d. at 395. 'The Seventh Circuit held that: 
the defendant's contact with Indiana were significantly more attenuated than 
the Calder defendant's contacts with California. California was the focal point 
both of the story and any harm suffered. 'The harm was uniquely related to 
California because the injury was primarily the result ofthe publication of the 
story to other California residents. Unlike the Calder defendants, the Wallace 
defendants took no action that created the necessary connection with Indiana 
for them to reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. 
63. See id. 
10
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sonal jurisdiction, this would significantly undercut the tradi-
tional due-process protection for out-of-state defendants. 64 
In Casualty Assurance Risk Insurance Brokerage Co. v. Dil-
lon65 the Ninth Circuit applied the Calder effects test in re-
viewing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out of state 
defendant. Medical Liability Purchasing Group (MLPG)66 at-
tempted to do business in Indiana by qualifying as an Indiana 
purchasing group offering medical malpractice insurance to 
health care providers. 67 Casualty Assurance Risk Insurance 
Brokerage Company (CARIB), which is incorporated under the 
laws of Guam, was MLPG's only insurance carrier and had 
never been licensed in Indiana nor any other state.66 The Indi-
ana Attorney General ordered MPLG and CARIB to cease ac-
tivities in Indiana because MLPG was not registered as a pur-
chasing group there.69 When the companies refused to comply, 
the Indiana Insurance Commissioner, John Dillon, contacted 
the Guam Insurance Commissioner to obtain information about 
CARIB. 70 
Id. 
64. See id. The court wrote: 
If, for example, an Indiana plaintiff sued a California defendant in an Indiana 
court under an intentional tort theory, the California defendant would be 
required to come to Indiana and defend the suit to protect himself, no matter 
how groundless or frivolous the suit might be. The 'effects test' is merely 
another way of assessing the defendant's relevant contacts with the forum 
state. The defendant must still purposefully avail himself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws. The forum State cannot hale the defendant into court 
solely as a result of random, fortuitous or attenuated contacts. 
65. See Casualty Assurance Risk Insurance Brokerage Co. v. Dillon, 976 F.2d 596 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
66. See id. at 598. Medical Liability Purchasing Group is closely related to Casu-
alty Assurance Risk Insurance Brokerage Company (CARIB). MLPG's checking ac-
count requires the signature of a CARIB vice-president. Additionally, CARIB employ-
ees in the Washington, D.C. office receive and open all of MLPG's mail and handle all 
ofMLPG's phone inquiries. 
67. See id. at 598. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. 
70. See Casualty Assurance, 976 F.2d at 598. This limited correspondence is the 
only contact Dillon has had with Guam. Subsequently, the Attorney General flIed for 
an injunction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. 
See id. 
11
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The Attorney General filed for an injunction in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, and 
in June 1989, the court enjoined MLPG's activities. 71 Shortly 
thereafter, Dillon mailed letters informing healthcare providers 
in Indiana that CARIB's purchasing group activities were en-
joined and CARIB's Certificate of Authority was revoked. 72 As 
a result of this letter, CARIB filed a tort action against John 
Dillon in the Unites States District Court for the District of 
Guam. 73 
CARIB argued that the Guam court could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over Dillon because his actions provided sufficient 
minimum contacts within Guam since his allegedly tortious 
conduct of mailing the letter affected CARIB's business in 
Guam.74 CARIB essentially argued that the "effects" of the al-
leged libel were felt by the Guam business and jurisdiction, 
therefore, existed wherever the business resides. 75 The district 
court dismissed CARIB's complaint, holding that exercising 
jurisdiction over Dillon would violate the Due Process Clause of 
the United States Constitution. 76 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 77 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that purposeful availment required more than just a 
fmding that an alleged tort had effects in the forum state. 78 
Unlike the defendant's actions in Calder, the Ninth Circuit 
found that Dillon's act of mailing a single letter in Indiana did 
not establish contact with Guam because he had no intention 
71. See id. "MPLG was ordered by the court to provide Dillon with the names and 
addresses of all healthcare providers they had solicited for business." Dillon was or· 
dered by the court to send a letter to those healthcare providers to inform them of the 
injunction. Id. 
72. See id. The letter was never sent to or circulated on Guam because CARIB 
had not solicited any business on Guam. Id. 
73. See id. at 597. 
74. See id. at 599. According to CARIB, minimum contacts existed because dam-
age to their business was a foreseeable effect of the letter sent by Dillon. CARIB relied 
primarily upon Calder to support its argument that jurisdiction exists wherever the 
effects of libel are felt. 
75. See Casualty Assurance, 976 F.2d at 601. 
76. See id. at 598. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. 
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that the letter would be widely circulated in the forum jurisdic-
tion. 79 
The courts have also applied the effects test analysis to 
defamation cases involving the Internet. In California Soft-
ware, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc. the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California exercised per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who delivered 
defamatory statements through the Internet.80 To determine 
whether personal jurisdiction in California was appropriate, 
the court relied on the reasoning in Calder, focusing on where 
the harm from the defamatory statements occurred. 81 The 
court exercised personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Cali-
fornia because the plaintiff, a California corporation, "felt the 
brunt of the harm from the defendant's out-of-state acts in 
California. "82 
In Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson,83 an Indiana Appeals Court 
applied the same personal jurisdiction analysis to another 
defamation case involving the Internet. Hickerson, a resident 
of Texas, published a web site that mentioned Conseco, Inc. 84 
Conseco brought a suit based upon Hickerson's use of Conseco's 
trademarked name "Conseco, Inc." in the text of his web site. 85 
After reviewing prior Internet jurisdiction cases in which 
courts had applied tl;1e effects test, the Conseco court found that 
79. See id. at 600. 
80. See California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 
(C.D. Cal. 1986). California Software and Reliability Research disagreed over the own-
ership of a software package. During the dispute, Reliability Research communicated 
with sevenil of California Software's prospective customers through the Internet in-
forming them ofthe dispute and that they would sue any of California Software's subli-
censees for damages if it won. See id. 
8!. See id. at 136!. 
82. See id. at 1363. 
83. See Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 
84. See id. at 817. Hickerson advertised on his site that he was wanted informa-
tion concerning fraud or other evidence of unfair treatment by Conseco. Hickerson 
explained that he sought this information to aid in a lawsuit he had ftled against Con-
seco. Hickerson's web site included a "mail-to" link enabling the user to send Hicker-
son e-mail to aid in the gathering of information. See id. 
85. See id. ("Conseco filed suit against Hickerson on December 12, 1997, in Indi-
ana, alleging trademark dilution and infringement, commercial disparagement, defa-
mation, and tortious interference with contractual relationships"). 
13
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those decisions did not rely solely on the effects test to find per-
sonal jurisdiction, but rather also looked to additional contacts 
with the forum that supported the exercise of jurisdiction. 86 
The court then concluded that it was not appropriate to apply 
the effects test at all in deciding Internet jurisdiction where the 
defendant is a corporation.87 The court explained, "the 'effects 
test' does not 'apply with the same force to a corporation as it 
does to an individual because a corporation's harm is generally 
not located in a particular geographic location as an individ-
ual's harm would be.n88 The court ultimately found that Hick-
erson's discussion of Conseco in his web site, without any other 
contacts, was not a minimum contact sufficient to allow Indi-
ana to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. 89 
B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION MEETS THE INTERNET 
Initially, courts were hesitant to expand their authority into 
the vast world of cyberspace, and therefore, they tended to con-
clude that the exercise of personal jurisdiction with respect to 
Internet users was unreasonable.90 The courts expressed a fear 
,of rampant litigation if they adopted an "open-door" approach 
in Internet lawsuits.91 
However, an Ohio court, in CompuServe v. Patterson, used a 
nonresident defendant's Internet contacts to establish personal 
86. See id. at 819. The Conseco court reviewed the decisions of EDIAS Software 
Int'l v. BASIS Int'l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. 
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); and Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 
414 (9th Cir. 1997). Id. 
87. See Conseco, 698 N.E. 2d at 819. The court reasoned that the "effects test" is 




89. See id. at 820. The Court of Appeals determined that: 
Hickerson's only contact with Indiana was his discussion of Conseco in his web 
site. Hickerson did not direct any advertising, send any e·mails or letters, or 
make any phone calls to Indiana. In addition, Hickerson had never physically 
visited or resided in Indiana. Hickerson simply did not purposefully avail 
himself of the benefits and protections of Indiana law. 
90. See Timothy B. Nagy, Personal Jurisdiction and Cyberspace: Establishing 
Precedent in a Borderless Era, 6 COMMLAW CONSPEcruS 101, 104 (Winter 1998). 
91. See Hearst v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097 at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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jurisdiction over the out-of-state resident.92 CompuServe was 
an Ohio corporation that provided access to its computer net-
work through the Internet.93 Patterson lived in Texas and had 
no contact with Ohio except through his modem on the Inter-
net.94 Patterson entered into an agreement with CompuServe 
whereby he could distribute his software programs to other 
Internet users using CompuServe's network.95 Patterson even-
tually became disgruntled when CompuServe began to market 
its own comparable program.96 CompuServe eventually filed 
suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, al-
leging that the agreement was made and performed in Ohio, 
the product's locus was in its server in Columbus, Ohio, and 
thus Patterson had sufficient contacts with the forum state. 97 
Although ultimately reversed by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,98 the district court held that Pat-
terson's contacts with Ohio were not sufficient to establish that 
he had purposefully availed himself of the laws of Ohio.99 The 
court found Patterson's Internet contacts with Ohio were too 
tenuous to establish jurisdiction and the district court simply 
acknowledged that to hold otherwise would be unfair. 100 
92. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, No. C2-94-91, slip op. at 3-4 (S.D. Ohio 
Mar. 23, 1995), rev'd, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 
93. See id. at 3. 
94. See id. 
95. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir. 1996). Patter-
son and CompuServe entered into a user Agreement which provided that: "The 
CompuServe information service ... consists of computing and information service and 
software, information and other content provided by CompuServe Inc. In addition, 
third parties provide information, software, and other content ... which may be ac-
cessed over the Service." [d. 
96. See id. at 1261. This lawsuit arose out of certain software which Patterson 
claims to have developed, and which is entitled "WinNav," "Windows Navigator," and 
"FlashPoint Windows Navigator." Sometime in late 1993, CompuServe announced to 
its users that it had developed, and would soon be releasing, a Windows version of a 
program to be entitled "CompuServe Navigator." As a result of this announcement, 
Patterson advised CompuServe of his claim to a common law trademark in the names 
"WinNav, "Windows Navigator," and "Flashpoint Windows Navigator," and suggested 
that if CompuServe released its software, it would be violating his trademark rights. 
[d. 
97. See id. at 1260. 
98. See infra, part III.D.1 for discussion ofthe Sixth Circuit's decision. 
99. See id. 
100. See id. 
15
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In a similar case, a di!;'!trict court in Florida refused to exert 
personal jurisdiction over the out of state defendant in Pres-
Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc. 10I System-One's 
server computers provided information to Pres-Kap for an air-
line and travel reservation service. 102 When a dispute arose 
over the performance of the server computer, System One filed 
suit in its home state of Florida. The Florida Appellate Court 
held that exercising personal jurisdiction over Pres-Kap was 
improper because the computer contact was insufficient to 
make jurisdiction reasonable. 103 Furthermore, the court noted 
that exerting personal jurisdiction over Pres-Kap would be un-
r.' 104 laIr. 
C. COURTS BEGIN TO EXERT JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE 
1. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. 
In the case of Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 105 
the District Court for the District of Connecticut found that 
sufficient contacts existed to establish personal jurisdiction 
over an out of state company.106 Inset Systems, located in Con-
necticut, developed and marketed computer software. 107 In-
struction Set, located in Massachusetts, provided computer 
technology and support to organizations. 108 Inset Systems reg-
istered the name "Inset" as its trademark. 109 Subsequently, 
Instruction Set obtained the name "Inset. com" as its Internet 
domain address. 11o Inset Systems brought suit against Instruc-
101. See Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
102. See id. at 1352. 
103. See id. at 1351. 
104. See id. at 1353. This result would subject individuals to litigation in courts lo-
cated in the home state of distant corporations. 
105. See Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D.Conn. 
1996). 
106. See Inset, 937 F. Supp at 162. 
107. See id. at 162. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. at 163. 
110. See id. 
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tion Set in the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut. 111 
In deciding to exercise personal jurisdiction over Instruction 
Set, the district court applied a minimum contacts analysis 
that focused on whether Instruction Set could reasonably an-
ticipate being hailed into court in Connecticut. 112 Even though 
Instruction Set did not have employees or offices in Connecti-
cut, nor did it conduct business in the state on a regular basis, 
the court established jurisdiction through Instruction Set's 
Internet access sites in Connecticut. 113 Since the Massachu-
setts corporation had purposefully availed itself of the privilege 
of doing business in Connecticut, primarily through its toll-free 
number in its Internet advertisements, the court concluded it 
could reasonably anticipate having to defend a lawsuit there. 114 
2. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Missouri, in Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.,115 also chose to as-
sert personal jurisdiction based on a company's use of the 
Internet. CyberGold operated an Internet server in California, 
which allowed users to sign onto a mailing list to receive adver-
tisements. 116 Maritz, a Missouri corporation, owned the trade-
111. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163. Inset System's main concern was that since the 
domain name was identical to the trademark name, users might inadvertently contact 
an unintended company and the result would be "confusion in the marketplace." 
Thereafter, the Internet user may not realize that the advertisement is actually from 
an unintended company, or the Internet user may erroneously assume that the source 
of information is the intended company. As a result, confusion in the marketplace 
could develop. 
112. See id. at 164. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
297 (1980). ("[Due process) limitations require that a nonresident corporate defendant 
have minimum contacts with the forum state such that it would reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there"). 
113. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165. Instruction Set had been continuously been ad-
vertising over the Internet in Connecticut. 
114. See id. 
115. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
116. See id. at 1330. Cybergold, Inc. established a web site at :ww..w..cy.be..rgold.cum. 
17
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mark rights to "CyberGold" and filed suit claiming trademark 
infringement and unfair competition. 117 
The Missouri court held that it could properly exercise ju-
risdiction over CyberGold based on CyberGold's advertisements 
over the InternetYs The court concluded that Missouri's long-
arm statute1l9 allowed jurisdiction over CyberGold because 
Maritz had suffered economic harm and injury in the state of 
Missouri as a result of CyberGold's activities in Missouri. 120 
Thus, these courts, as well as others, had used Internet ac-
tivities to subject defendants to personal jurisdiction not only 
in their home state but potentially in all fifty states. Most 
courts, however, were uncomfortable with the notion that an 
individual could be subjected to personal jurisdiction in any 
state simply by placing information on the Internet. Therefore, 
several courts have taken a different approach to deciding 
when a nonresident defendant can be subjected to out of state 
personal jurisdiction through his or her activities on the Inter-
net. 
D. STRIVING FOR CONSISTENCY: INTERNET PERSONAL 
JURI.SDICTION THRoUGH MINIMUM CONTACTS 
In the past two years, the approaches to jurisdiction imple-
mented by courts have demonstrated a more reasoned analysis 
and greater consistency. Several courts have applied a mini-
mum contacts analysis to a defendant's Internet activities to 
determine if personal jurisdiction can be exercised. 
117. See id. at 1329-30. Maritz asserts that CyberGold's web site acts as a state-
wide advertisement for CyberGold's forthcoming service, and through its website, Cy-
berGold is actively soliciting customers from Missouri. 
118. See id. at 1330. The web site was not operational; it merely promoted the up-
coming service to be provided. 
119. See id. at 1330-31. Missouri's long-arm statute allows the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion over nonresidents to the extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution. 
120. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1331. The court held that CyberGold, through its 
website, has consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all Internet 
users, knowing that such information will be transmitted globally. Thus, CyberGold's 
contacts were of such quality and nature that they favored the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction. 
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1. CompuServe v. Patterson 
In CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson. 121 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's 
rejection of personal jurisdiction based on the defendant's 
Internet activities. In so doing, the Sixth Circuit joined the cur-
rent trend in which the courts more closely examine the ques-
tion of personal jurisdiction by viewing the defendant's Inter-
net activities in the context of sufficient minimum contacts 
with the forum state. 122 
Patterson, from his home in Texas, entered into an on-line 
"Shareware Registration Agreement" with CompuServe, an 
Ohio corporation, to market his software. l23 The Sixth Circuit 
determined that Patterson's relationship with CompuServe as 
a software provider and marketer was a crucial indicator that 
Patterson had knowingly reached out to CompuServe's Ohio 
home and benefited from CompuServe's handling of his soft-
ware and fees. 124 
The Sixth Circuit focused on whether Patterson's contacts 
with Ohio, where the computer network service was headquar-
121. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). "The district 
court held that the electronic links between the defendant Patterson, who is a Texan, 
and Ohio, where CompuServe is headquartered, were 'too tenuous to support the exer-
cise ofpersonaljurisdiction.m Id. at 1259-60. 
122. See Timothy B Nagy, Personal Jurisdiction and Cyberspace: Establishing 
Precedent in a Broderless Era, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 101, 107 (Winter 1998). See 
also CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 
Id. 
[d. 
123. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261. The court stated: 
From 1991 through 1994, Patterson electronically transmitted 32 master 
software files to CompuServe. These fIles were stored in CompuServe's 
system in Ohio, and they were displayed in different services for CompuServe 
subscribers, who could download them into their own computers and, if they 
chose to do so, pay for them. Patterson also advertised his software on the 
CompuServe system, and he indicated a price term in at least one 
advertisement. 
124. See id. at 1264. The court wrote: 
[patterson) subscribed to CompuServe, and then he entered into the 
Shareware Registration Agreement when he loaded his software onto the 
CompuServe system for others to use. Once Patterson had done these two 
things, he was on notice that he had made contracts, to be governed by Ohio 
law, with an Ohio-based company. Moreover, [Patterson) initiated the events 
that led to the filing of this suit by making demands of CompuServe via 
electronic and regular mail messages. 
19
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tered, were substantial. 125 Beyond rmding that Patterson in-
tentionally reached out from Texas to Ohio by subscribing to 
CompuServe,126 the Sixth Circuit emphasized that Patterson 
had originated and maintained his contacts with Compu-
Serve.127 The Sixth Circuit also determined that Ohio's exercise 
of its jurisdiction was reasonable because, although defending 
the suit in Ohio would be burdensome to Patterson, he volun-
tarily placed his software on CompuServe's Ohio based sys-
tem. l28 
In determining whether Patterson's electronic contacts with 
the forum were sufficient to support personal jurisdiction, the 
court applied a three-pronged test similar to the test estab-
lished by International ShoeYI.9 The court found that all three 
prongs of the constitutional test were met in CompuServe. The 
court also pointed out, however, that anyone of these contacts 
alone would probably be insufficient to support jurisdiction. 130 
For example, the act of merely entering into the online contract 
with CompuServe would not constitute sufficient minimum 
contacts with Ohio. 131 Furthermore, the court stated that "Pat-
terson's injection of his software into the stream of commerce 
without more, would be, at best, a dubious ground for jurisdic-
tion."i32 However, because Patterson deliberately did both, the 
125. See id. The Sixth Circuit believes it is the quality of the contacts, and not the 
number or status, that determines whether they amount to purposeful availment. See 
id. at 1265. 
126. See id. at 1266. 
127. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1266. The Sixth Circuit focused on Patterson's 
repeated use of electronic and regular mail for messages to CompuServe and the post· 
ing of a message on one of CompuServe's electronic forums. [d. 
128. See id. at 1267. Someone like Patterson who employs a computer network 
service like CompuServe to market a product can reasonably expect disputes with that 
service to yield lawsuits in the service's home state. See id. at 1268. Since Patterson 
chose to transmit his product from Texas to CompuServe's system in Ohio, the Sixth 
Circuit concluded that Patterson purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing 
business in Ohio. See id. at 1264. 
129. See id. at 1263. The Ninth Circuit uses a three part test for specific jurisdic-
tion: (1) the nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction 
with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 
privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and pro-
tections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the 
defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. 
130. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267. 
131. See id. at 1265. 
132. [d. (citing Asahi Metal Idus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)). 
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Sixth Circuit found the contacts sufficient to assert jurisdic-
tion. l33 
2. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,134 also de-
veloped a framework to determine how to properly exercise ju-
risdiction. 
Bensusan operated the "The Blue Note" jazz club in New 
York and owned all rights, title, and interest in the federally 
registered mark "The Blue Note."I35 King was the owner and 
operator of "The Blue Note" club in Columbia, Missouri. l36 
King posted a site on the Internet to promote his club using the 
words "The Blue Note" on it.137 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York focused on whether the creation of a web site ac-
companied by a telephone number to order the advertised 
product was an offer to sell to residents in the forum state. 138 
133. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265. The court wrote: 
We find support for our conclusion in the Ohio Supreme Court case of U.S. 
Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. Mr. K'8 Foods, Inc., 624 N.E. 2d 1048, 
1052-54 (1994). In that case, the court held that a foreign corporation 
'transacted business' in Ohio, and thus was subject to personal jurisdiction, 
where it frequently made long-distance telephone calls to Ohio to sell its 
products, had distribution facilities in Ohio for its products, and shipped goods 
to Ohio for sale. Similarly, Patterson frequently contacted Ohio to sell his 
computer software over CompuServe's Ohio-based system. Patterson 
repeatedly sent his 'goods' to CompuServe in Ohio for their sale. CompuServe, 
in effect, acted as Patterson's distributor, albeit electronically, and not 
physically. 
See id. 
134. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
135. See id. at 297. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. ("This web site, which is located on a computer server in Missouri, al-
legedly contains a logo that is substantially similar to the logo utilized by Bensusan. It 
contains general information about the club in Missouri as well as a calendar of events 
and ticketing information"). 
138. See id. at 299. The Second Circuit has held that trademark infringement oc-
curs "where the passing off occurs, i.e., where the deceived customer buys the defen- . 
dant's product in the belief that he is buying the plaintiff's." Using this standard, 
courts have found that "an offering for sale of even one copy of an infringing product in 
New York, even if no sale results, is suffucuent to vest a court with jurisdiction over 
21
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Distinguishing the defendant's action in Bensusan from the 
defendant's conduct in CompuServe, the district court deter-
mined that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over 
King. 139 Whereas, in CompuServe, Patterson specifically tar-
geted Ohio by subscribing to. CompuServe, King had done 
nothing to purposefully avail himself of the benefits of New 
York. 140 Similar to placing a product into the stream of com-
merce, creating a web site may be felt nationwide, or even 
world wide, but without more, it was not an act purposefully 
directed toward a particular forum state. 141 Even assuming 
that the user was confused about the relationship of the Mis-
souri club to the one in New York, the court reasoned that such 
an act of infringement would have occurred in Missouri, not 
New York. 142 
In affirming the district court's order, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the assertion 
of jurisdiction would violate due process. l43 The Second Circuit 
acknowledged the need for a flexible application of the tradi-
tional standards for establishing jurisdiction when addressing 
the alleged infringer." 1d. (quoting Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton CO., 234 F.2d 
633,639 (2d Cir. 1956». 
139. See BensuBan, 937 F. Supp at 301. The court focused on the fact that it takes 
several afilrmative steps by the New York residents to obtain access to the web site 
and to use the information there. Furthermore, the mere fact that a person can gain 
information on the allegedly infringing product is not the equivalent of a person adver-
tising, promoting, selling or otherwise making an effort to target its product in New 
York. See id. at 299. 
140. See id. at 301. Patterson purposefully availed himself of the benefits of Ohio 
by entering into an agreement to sell his software over the Internet, by advertising 
through the service, and selling his software to CompuServe in Ohio. "King, like nu-
merous others, simply created a web site and permitted anyone who could fmd it to 
access it." 1d. 
141. See id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 
(1992». Most courts follow the reasoning set forth in Bensusan and decline to assert 
jurisdiction based solely on Web site advertising. See e.g., Patriot Systems, Inc. v. C-
Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Utah 1998); SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Investments, 
985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp: 327,333 (D.N.J. 
1997); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997); No 
Mayo-San Francisco v. Memminger, 1998 WL 544974 (N.D. Calif. 1998); CFOs 2 Go, 
Inc. v. CFO 2 Go, Inc., 1998 WL 320821 (N.D. Calif. 1998); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 
No. 96 Civ. 3620,1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
142. See Bensusan, 937 F.Supp at 299. 
143. Se~ id. at 301. The district court determined that King did not direct any con-
tacts towards New York, did not have any contact with New York, and he did not in-
tend to avail himself of any of New York's benefits. See id. 
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issues concerning the Internet. 144 However, the traditional 
minimum contacts requirement could not be brushed aside. 
3. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger 
The court in Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger145 relied on the Ben-
susan court's reasoning to define when to exercise personal ju-
risdiction over Internet activities. Goldberger developed a 
computer network to provide legal support services to individ-
ual attorneys. 146 Hearst, publisher of "Esquire" magazine, ar-
gued that Goldgberger's domain name "Esqwire.com" infringed 
on its trademark. 147 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York held that the personal jurisdiction issue must be 
resolved by analogy to existing, non-Internet case laW. 148 In 
considering the nature and quality of Goldberg's contacts, the 
court noted that Goldberg's web site was not targeted at the 
144. See id. at 299. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that 
"although we realize that attempting to apply established trademark law in the fast-
developing world of the Internet is somewhat like trying to board a moving bus, we 
believe that well-established doctrines of personal jurisdiction law [apply)." Id. 
145. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
146. See id. at *3. Goldberger's idea was to create an electronic law office infra-
structure network that would provide individual attorneys, via computer, with legal 
support services equivalent to those available to lawyers in large law firms. 
147. See id. The complaint alleges that Hearst's "Esquire" and "Esq" marks have 
acquired tremendous secondary meaning and that those marks are inherently distinc-
tive, nonfunctional, strong and famous marks entitled to a very broad scope of protec-
tion. Id. 
148. See Hearst, 1997 WL 97097 at *7. The relevant portion of the New York long-
arm statute requires that the non-domiciliary defendant transact business in the state' 
and the cause of action must arise out of such a transaction for jurisdiction to lie in 
New York. See id. at *9. New York "long-arm" jurisdiction is codified in CPLR § 302 
(a) which provides: 
Id. 
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, 
a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary .. , who in 
person or through an agent: (1) transacts any business within the state or 
contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or (2) commits a 
tortious act within the state, or (3) commits a tortious act without the state 
causing injury to person or property within the state ... if he (i) regularly does 
or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or 
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, 
in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have 
consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or 
international commerce. 
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residents of New York or of any other particular state. 149 
Therefore, the court found that Goldberger's contacts with New 
York residents bye-mail were insufficient to establish jurisdic-
tion. l50 
4. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. 
The Ninth Circuit, in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 151 fur-
ther defined the meaning of the purposeful availment prong of 
personal jurisdiction in an Internet case. 152 In Cybersell, an 
Arizona corporation (hereafter "Cybersell.AZ") that held a reg-
istered service markl53 for the name "Cybersell," brought suit 
against a Florida corporation (hereafter "Cybersell.FL").154 The 
Florida corporation maintained a website with the word "Cy-
bersell" and the phrase "Welcome to Cybersell!" at the top of its 
site. 155 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Arizona District Court's 
ruling that the use of an allegedly infringing service mark on a 
passive web site did not result in sufficient contacts with the 
forum state to support personal jurisdiction. 156 The Ninth Cir-
149. See id. at *11. The court referred to previous instances which held that adver-
tisements directed towards the New York market and the use of an 800 number were 
insufficient to satisfy the transaction of business requirement. See Diskin v. Starck, 
538 F. Supp. 877,880 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
150. See Hearst, 1997 WL 97097 at *8. The court compared the transmittal of e-
mail messages to the act of sending a single letter or engaging in a telephone conversa-
tion. Because the Web enables easy world-wide access, allowing computer interaction 
via the web to supply sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction would eviscerate the 
personal jurisdiction requirement as it currently exists. See id. at *12. 
151. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). 
152. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). 
153. The term service mark means any word, name symbol, or device or any combi-
nation thereof - (1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to 
use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this 
chapter, to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique 
service, from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if 
that source is unknown. Titles, character names, and other distinctive features of 
radio or television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that 
they, to the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127. 
154. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 415. Cybersell.AZ filed suit alleging that Cybersell 
FL's use of "Cybersell" on its web page gave rise to trademark infringement, unfair 
competition and fraud. 
155. See id. 
156. See id. at 420. 
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cuit reasoned that simply maintaining a web site, accessible to 
Arizona residents, did not qualify as "purposeful activity" in-
voking the benefits and protections of Arizona. 157 
In striving to consistently apply personal jurisdiction to 
Internet disputes, the courts have required "something more" 
than mere maintenance of a web site to indicate that the de-
fendant purposefully directed his activity in a substantial way 
to the forum state. l58 
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS IN PANAVISION 
Within this historical context, the Ninth Circuit considered 
whether the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over Toeppen satisfied the requirements of Due Process. 159 The 
court began its analysis with California's long-arm statute 
which permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of 
the United States Constitution. 160 
The court next noted that personal jurisdiction may be 
based on either general or specific jurisdiction. 161 The Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Cali-
fornia court lacked general jurisdiction over Toeppen. There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit applied the three-part test to determine 
whether the district court had properly exercised specific per-
[d. 
157. See id. at 419. The court explained: 
All that the Florida company did was post an essentially passive home page on 
the web, using the name 'Cybersell,' which the Arizona company was in the 
process of registering as a federal service mark. While there is no question 
that anyone, anywhere could access that home page and thereby learn about 
the services offered, we cannot see how from that fact alone it can be inferred 
that the Florida company deliberately directed its merchandising efforts 
toward Arizona residents. 
158. See id. at 418. The Ninth Circuit concluded that "no court has ever held before 
that an Internet advertisement alone is sufficient to subject a party to jurisdiction in 
another state." [d. 
159. See Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). 
160. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1997) ("Section 410.10 permits Califor-
nia courts to exercise judicial jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the state 
or federal constitutions"). 
161. See PaTUlvision II, 141 F.3d at 1320. 
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sonal jurisdiction over Toeppen.162 This three-part test in-
cludes: 
(1) the nonresident defendant must do some act or con-
summate some transaction with the forum or perform 
some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 
privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the 
claim must be one which arises out of or results from 
the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise 
of jurisdiction 'must be reasonable. 163 
In its analysis of the personal availment requirement of 
specific jurisdiction, ,the Ninth Circuit reviewed precedent from 
other circuits to determine how to exercise personal jurisdiction 
in cyberspace. 164 
The Ninth Circuit adopted the district court's reasoning 
that Toeppen aimed his allegedly infringing acts at Panavision 
to cause Panavision harm in California, its principal place of 
business. l65 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper be-
cause Toeppen's out of state activities were intended to, and 
did, have harmful effects in California. 166 
162. See id. 
163. See id. 
164. See id. See also Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419-20. Having recently discussed the 
personal availment aspect of personal jurisdiction in a case involving the Internet, the 
Ninth Circuit relied on its precedent in Cybersell. See id. In reaching a decision in 
Cybersell, the Ninth Circuit reviewed cases from other circuits regarding how personal 
jurisdiction should be exercised in cyberspace. See id. at 418; CompuServe v. Patterson, 
89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996». 
Id. 
165. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1322. The court noted: 
Toeppen knew Panavision would likely suffer harm there because, although at 
all relevant times Panavision was a Delaware limited partnership, its 
principal place of business was in California, and the heart of the theatrical 
motion picture and television industry is located there. 
166. See id. at 1321. The Ninth Circuit analogizes the harm to Panavision as 
similar to the harm to the Indianapolis Colts football team in Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. 
Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd. Partnership, 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994). 
There, the Indianapolis Colts brought a trademark infringement action in the district 
court in Indiana against the Canadian Football League's new team, the Baltimore CFL 
Colts. The Seventh Circuit held that the Baltimore CFL Colts team was subject to 
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The Ninth Circuit admitted "at the very least, this action is 
more akin to a tort claim than a contract claim."167 Therefore, 
the Ninth Circuit stated that a tort analysis provided the 
proper analytical framework. 168 By characterizing the in-
fringement activities as a tort aimed at California, the court 
established that a California court had personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant under the Calder effects test. 169 Although 
Toeppen's web site was merely passive, as was King's web site 
in Bensusan, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Toeppen's con-
duct from King's activities on the basis that King's web site 
was for a lawful business not directed at any particular fo-
rum. 170 According to the court, Toeppen, on the other hand, 
was a "cybersquatter," aiming his scam at Panavision in Cali-
fornia.l7l 
personal jurisdiction in Indiana even though its only activity directed toward Indiana 
was the broadcast of its games on nationwide cable television. Because the Indianapo-
lis Colts used their trademarks in Indiana, any infringement of those marks would 
create an injury which would be felt mainly in Indiana, and this, coupled with the 
defendant's "entry" into the state by the television broadcasts, was sufficient for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. 
167. See Panavision 1,938 F. Supp at 621. The district court cites Ziegler, 64 F.3d 
at 474, which holds that a 42 U.s.C.A. § 1983 claim is more akin to a tort claim than a 
contract claim and used the effects test to analyze the purposeful availment prong of 
the jurisdiction test. (citing Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474. Holding that a 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 
claim [for deprivation of a constitutional right] is more akin to a tort claim than a con-
tract claim and using the effects test to analyze the purposeful availment prong of the 
jurisdiction test.). 
168. See id. 
169. See id. In a tort setting, Calder established that personal jurisdiction may be 
predicated on (1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing 
harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the defendant knows is likely to be 
suffered in the forum state. Toeppen allegedly registered Panavision's trademarks as 
domain names with the knowledge that the names belonged to Panavision with the 
intent to interfere with Panavision's business. Toeppen expressly aimed his conduct at 
California. Finally, Toeppen has harmed Panavision, the brunt of which Panavision 
has borne in Califormia, which Toeppen likely knew would happen because Panavi-
sion's principal place of business is in California. The court concluded that Toeppen 
did not engage in "untargeted negligence" but has "expressly aimed" his tortious activi-
ties at California. 1 d. 
170. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
171. See id. The district court concluded that Toeppen was not conducting a busi-
ness, but instead running a scam directed specifically at Pan avis ion in California. 
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A. GENERAL JURISDICTION 
Toeppen is domiciled in Illinois. The Ninth Circuit upheld 
the district court's ruling that Toeppen's activities in California 
were not substantial nor continuous and systematic. 172 Point-
ing out that courts have uniformly rejected Internet activity as 
a basis for general personal jurisdiction when there is a lack of 
systematic or continuous and substantial activities within the 
forum state, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision that exer-
cising general jurisdiction over Toeppen in California was not 
proper. 173 
B. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION 
The Ninth Circuit next applied the three-part test to deter-
mine whether the district court properly exercised specific ju-
risdiction over Toeppen.174 First, Toeppen had to have com-
pleted "some act or consummate[d] some transaction with the 
forum or perform [ed] some act by which he purposefully 
avail[ed] himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the 
forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and privileges of its 
laws."175 Second, Panavision's claim "must arise out of or result 
from Toeppen's forum-related activity."176 Third, the court's 
"exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable."177 
Purposeful availment can be satisfied if the defendant takes 
deliberate action toward the forum state. 178 Finding that Toep-
pen knew Panavision would likely suffer harm in California, 
the Ninth· Circuit upheld the district court's rmding that Toep-
pen's conduct was deliberate and was akin to an intentional 
tort. 179 
172. See Panavision I, 938 F.Supp at 620. The district court found that Toeppen 
was in California only twice in 1996. 
173. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1320. 
174. See id. 
175. [d. 
176. See id. 
177. See id. 
178. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1320 
179. See id. at 1321. The district court stated that: 
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Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Panavision's 
claims arose out of Toeppen's California related conduct. ISO The 
court concluded that, "but for" Toeppen's conduct directed to-
ward Panavision in California, Panavision would not have been 
injured and the suit would not have been brought. 18.1 Thus, To-
eppen had purposefully availed himself of the privileges of the 
state of California. 
The Ninth Circuit placed the burden on Toeppen to estab-
lish that other considerations rendered jurisdiction unreason-
able since he had purposefully directed his activities at Cali-
fornia. 182 The court examined the seven factors established in 
Burger King to conclude the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
was reasonable. 183 
Panavision's allegations may be summarized as follows: Panavision and 
Panaflex are valuable trademarks associated with Panavision's business. A 
domain name is the primary way businesses are located on the Internet. The 
registration of its trademarks as domain names is valuable to Panavision 
because it allows Internet users who are familiar with the trademarks to 
easily search the Internet, locate Panavision's web site, and review any 
information that Panavision has posted. Toeppen identified Panavision as a 
business whose trademarks were not registered as domain names. Toeppen 
then registered Panavision's trademarks as his own domain names. Toeppen 
registered Panavision's trademarks because he believed that Panavision would 
eventually decide to create its own web address using its trademarks, that 
Panavision would discover that Toeppen had previously registered the 
trademarks as domain names, and that Panavision would pay Toeppen to 
relinquish his domain registrations rather than incur the expense and delay 
inherent in suing him. 
Panavision I, 938 F. Supp. at 621. 
180. See Panavision 11, 141 F.3d at 1322. 
181. See id. 
182. See id. See Core-Vent v. Nobel Industries, 11 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993) 
("IW)here a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents 
seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence of 
some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable"). 
183. See Panavision 11, 141 F.3d at 1323. In Burger King, the Supreme Court es-
tablished the following factors: 
(1) the extent of a defendant's purposeful interjection, (2) the burden on the 
defendant in defending in the forum state, (3) the extent of conflict with the 
sovereignty of the defendant's state, (4) the forum state's interest in 
adjudicating the dispute, (5) the most judicial resolution of the controversy, (6) 
the importance of the forum state to the plaintiffs interest in convenient and 
effective relief, and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. 
Burger King v. Rudewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985). Because of the inherent and 
necessary flexibility of the "fair play and substantial justice" standard, it is difficult to 
provide an exhaustive list of possible factors affecting a court's determination of fair-
ness In a personal jurisdiction dispute. A fairly complete list of factors recurrently 
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First, the Ninth Circuit considered the extent of Toeppen's 
purposeful interjection. l84 As a result of aiming his acts at 
Panavision in California, and knowing that it would likely in-
jure Panavision in California, in addition to demanding 
$13,000 to release his registration of "Panavision.com," the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that Toeppen sufficiently interjected 
his activities into California. 185 
Second, the Ninth Circuit considered the burden that would 
be placed upon Toeppen if he had to defend against Panavi-
sion's claims in California. l86 The inconvenience to Toeppen 
must amount to a deprivation of due process in order to over-
come the court's decision to exercise jurisdiction. 187 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed and restated the district court's ruling that "in 
this era of fax machines and discount air travel," requiring To-
eppen to litigate in California was not unreasonable. 188 
Third, the Ninth Circuit considered the extent to which the 
district court's exercise of jurisdiction in California would con-
flict with the sovereignty of Illinois, Toeppen's state of domi-
cile. 189 The Ninth Circuit concluded that a sovereignty conflict 
is not of concern in this case because the federal analysis would 
be the same in either California or Illinois. 190 
taken into account is set forth in Fisher Goverrwr Co. v. Superior Court, 347 P.2d 1,3·4 
(1959): 
(1) the interest of the state in providing a forum for its residents, (2) the state's 
interest in regulating the business involved, (3) the relative availability of 
evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than 
another, (4) the ease of access to an alternative forum, (5) the avoidance of 
multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications, and (6) the extent to which 
the cause of action arose out of the defendant's local activity. 
FREINDENTHAL ET AL., § 3.10, at 125·27 (West 2d ed. 1993). 
184. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1323. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. 
187. See id at 1323. The Ninth Circuit decided that the burden on Toeppen as an 
individual living in Illinois to litigate in California was significant. However, the in-
convenience was not so great as to deprive him of due process. See id. (citing Caruth v .. 
Int'l Psychoanalytical Ass'n, 59 F.3d 126, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1995». 
188. See Panavision 1,938 F. Supp. at 622 (quoting Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 
1365 (9th Cir. 1990». 
189. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1323 (citing Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1489). 
190. See id. 
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Fourth, the Ninth Circuit considered the forum state's in-
terest in adjudicating the dispute. 191 California maintains a 
strong interest in providing an effective means of redress for its 
residents who are tortiously injured. l92 Since Panavision's 
principal place of business is in California, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that this factor weighed in Panavision's favor.' 
Fifth, the Ninth Circuit considered the most efficient judi-
cial resolution of the controversy.l93 The efficient resolution 
factor focuses on the location of the evidence and witnesses. 194 
The Ninth Circuit concluded again that the modern advances 
in communication and transportation render this factor of little 
weight.195 With the limited amount of evidence and few poten-
tial witnesses, this factor in this case was likely neutral. 196 
Sixth, the Ninth Circuit considered the importance of the fo-
rum to Panavision's interest in convenient and effective re-
lief. 197 The Ninth Circuit gave little weight to Panavision's in-
convenience if it had to go outside California to gain relief. 198 
The court determined that while it may be more costly and in-
convenient for Panavision to seek relief in another state, this 
burden is relatively slight. l99 Thus, this factor weighed slightly 
against the' California district court exerting jurisdiction over 
Toeppen.200 
The allegations in support of Panavision's state law claim and those in support 
of its federal claim under the Trademark Dilution Act require the same 
analysis. The federal analysis would be the same in either Illinois or 
California. The exercise of jurisdiction by a federal court in California does 
not implicate sovereignty concerns of Illinois. 
Id. 
191. See id. 
192. See id. (quoting Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1996». 
193. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1323. 
194. See id. (citing Caruth, 59 F.3d at 129). 
195. See id. (citing Caruth, 59 F.3d at 129). 
196. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1323·24. 
197. See id. at 1323. A plaintiff is entitled to convenient and effective relief. See id. 
at 1324 (citing Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 476). 
198. See id. 
199. See id. The Ninth Circuit refers to Ziegler, 64, F.3d at 476. ("The Ninth Cir-
cuit rules that while a California corporation would be inconvenienced by having to 
litigate in Florida, 'neither the Supreme Court nor our court has given much weight to 
inconvenience to the plaintiff.'"). 
200. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1324. 
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Lastly, the Ninth Circuit considered the existence of an al-
ternative forum.201 Illinois was an alternative forum that 
would not place an unreasonable burden on Panavision.202 Al-
though the court found that it may be more costly and incon-
venient for Panavision to litigate in Illinois, this was still not 
an unreasonable burden.203 Therefore, this factor weighed in 
favor of Toeppen.204 
In balancing the Burger King factors, the Ninth Circuit co~­
cluded that, even though some of the factors weighed in Toep-
pen's favor,205 he failed to present a compelling case that the 
district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction in California 
was unreasonable.206 In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit ruled 
that all of the requirements were satisfied for the district court 
to exercise specific, personal jurisdiction over Toeppen.207 
v. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court's exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over Toeppen was proper because 
Toeppen's out of state activities intentionally caused harmful 
effects in California.208 The court acknowledged, however, that 
simply registering another's trademark as a domain name and 
posting a web site on the Internet would be insufficient to sub-
ject a nonresident defendant to jurisdiction. 209 
In Bensusan and Cybersell, the courts would not assert ju-
risdiction over the nonresident defendant in a trademark ac-
201. See id. at 1323. 
202. See id. 
203. See id. at 1324. 
204. See id. 
205. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1324. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the follow· 
ing factors weighed in Toeppen's favor: (1) convenient and effective relief for plaintiff, 
and (2) alternative forum. 
206. See id. 
207. See id. 
208. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 619 (C.D. Ca. 1996). 
By claiming Toeppen's activities were analogous to a tort aimed at California, the 
Panaviswn district court applied the Calder effects test to gain jurisdiction over him. 
209. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997). See 
also Te{al, SA. v. Products International Co., 529 F.2d at 496 (a cause of action for 
trademark infringement arises where the passing off occurs). 
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tion.210 In contrast, however, the courts in Inset Systems, 
Maritz, and Panavision established personal jurisdiction over 
the nonresident defendants at the plaintiffs primary place of 
business based on contacts quite similar to Bensusan and Cy-
bersell.211 These inconsistencies must be reconciled. 
A THE NINTH CIRCUIT IGNORED ITS HOLDING IN CYBERSELL 
First, the Ninth Circuit's application of the Calder effects 
test, to establish personal jurisdiction, is in direct conflict with 
its previous decision in Cybersell. 212 In Cybersell, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that the effects test cannot be applied with the 
same force to a corporation as it does to an individual. This is 
because a corporation generally cannot suffer harm in a par-
ticular geographic location, to the same extent as an individual 
does.213 In Panavision, however, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that Toeppen's conduct was directed at California even though 
Panavision, an international corporation, was the victim of his 
acts. To say that Toeppen's conduct was felt in California and 
gave rise to personal jurisdiction over him there was not a 
proper result of the Calder effects test. 
To rectify this apparent contradiction and justify exercising 
jurisdiction over Toeppen, the Ninth Circuit relied on its rea-
soning in Core-Vent, holding that Calder does not preclude a 
determination that a corporation suffers the brunt of harm in 
210. See generally Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). 
211. See generally Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. 
Conn. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D.Mo. 1996); 
Panavision II, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
212. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301. In Cybersell, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Cybersell FL's contacts are insufficient to establish purposeful availment: 
We decline to go further solely on the footing that Cybersell AZ has alleged 
trademark infringement over the Internet by Cybersell FL's use of the 
registered name 'Cybersell' on an essentially passive web page advertisement. 
Otherwise, every complaint arising out of alleged trademark infringement on 
the Internet would automatically result in personal jurisdiction wherever the 
plaintiffs principal place of business is located. That would not comport with 
traditional notions of what qualifies as purposeful activity invoking the 
benefits and protections of the forum state. 
Cybersell, 130 F .3d at 4. 
213. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420 (citing Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 
11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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its principal place of business.214 However, the Ninth Circuit 
did not apply this analysis in Cybersell on the basis that Cyber-
sell did nothing more than register the domain name and ad-
vertise over the Internet.215 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT PLACED INORDINATE WEIGHT ON THE 
EFFECTS TEST ANALYSIS 
By exercising personal jurisdiction over Toeppen through 
the Calder effects test, the Ninth Circuit also placed itself in 
conflict with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Wallace. 216 In 
that case, the Seventh Circuit found that Calder did not hold 
that "any plaintiff may hale any defendant into court in the 
plaintiffs home state, where the defendant has no contacts, 
merely ·by asserting that the defendant has committed an in-
tentional tort against the plaintiff."217 The Seventh Circuit held 
that the effects test was not meant to be a substitution for 
mjnjmum contacts; it was merely another way of assessing the 
defendant's relevant contacts with the forum state.218 
214. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1322, n. 2 (citing Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1487). 
Other circuits have implicitly applied Calder in cases with corporate plaintiffs to de-
termine where the brunt of the harm is felt. See, e.g., First American First v. National 
Ass'n of Bank Women, 802 F.2d 1511, 1517 (4th Cir. 1986); Blue Ridge Bank v. Veri-
banc, Inc., 755 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1985); Paccar Int'l, Inc. v. Commercial Bank of Ku-
wait, 757 F.2d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985). 
215. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1321. "In each case where personal jurisdiction 
was exercised; there had been 'something more' to indicate that the defendant purpose-
fully directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum state. Cybersell had not 
done this." 
216. See Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff in 
Wallace argued that Ninth Circuit precedent in Panavision should be followed whereby 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that since Toeppen allegedly committed an intentional 
tort, he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in California. However, 
the Seventh Circuit in Wallace concluded that the plaintiff's reliance on Calder was 
misplaced. [d. 
[d. 
217. See id. 
218. See id. at 395. The court stated: 
The defendant must still purposefully avail himself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws. The forum state cannot hale the defendant into court 
solely as a result of random, fortuitous or attenuated contacts. The key to 
Calder is that the effects of an alleged intentional tort are to be assessed as 
part of the analysis of the defendant's relevant contacts with the forum. 
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The Ninth Circuit, by affirming personal jurisdiction over 
Toeppen pursuant to the effects test, weakened the traditional 
minimum contacts analysis that required a defendant to pur-
posefully avail himself of the benefits of the forum state. In 
Pana v ision , the Ninth Circuit in essence based jurisdiction 
solely on the district court's fmding that Toeppen's conduct was 
akin to a tort. The effects test should, as the Seventh Circuit 
has held, be a part of the personal jurisdiction analysis, not the 
sole element. 
C. BASING PERSONAL JURISDICTION ON THE FACT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT IS A CYBERSQUATTER CREATES A SLIPPERY SLOPE 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Panavision rested heavily on 
the finding that Toeppen was a "cyber-squatter."219 This find-
ing was based on the fact that Toeppen had registered many 
domain names, several of which consisted of registered trade-
marks, and that he asked for money when Pariavision wanted 
to acquire the domain name.220 However, as a subsequent case, 
KC.P.L. v. Nash,221 held that if a defendant registers a limited 
number of domain names, and the majority are not registered 
trademarks of others, the defendant is not a "cyber-pirate. "222 
Apparently, the definition of what actions rise to the level of 
a "cyber-squatter" becomes quite important because, under the 
Ninth Circuit's application of the Calder effects test, a defen-
dant who commits an intentional tort is almost automatically 
subject to the jurisdiction of the court in a corporation's home 
state. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit did not create a clear 
defmition in Panavision. Although Toeppen had a facially le-
gitimate reason for the registration of the "panavision.com" 
219. See Panavision I, at 619. 
220. See Panavision II, 141 F.3d at 1319. 
221. 1998 WL 823657 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
222. See K.C.P.L. v. Nash, 1998 WL 823657 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). While Toeppen 
did not demonstrate his domain name "Panavision.com" had any connection to a Ie· 
gitimate business, Nash did provide an affidavit the "reaction.com" was connected to 
his efforts to create a legitimate business. See id. Nash claims he invested "hundreds 
and hundreds of hours of labor" to create a web sote in connection with his domain 
name "reaction.com" to create an information service. Id. at *2. 
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domain name, he .was still subjected to having to defend him-
self in a far away state. 223 The court's decision in Panaviswn 
begs the question of when does a person register too many do-
main names so that he or she is subject to being haled into 
court wherever these domain names cause injury. 224 Basing 
jurisdiction on such as unclear standard could subject innocent 
web site creators to unfairly having to defend themselves in far 
off fora, which in tum could stifle Internet creativity. 
D. A DEFENDANT MUST PuRPOSEFULLY AVAIL HIMSELF OF 
CONDUCTING ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FORUM STATE 
Courts require a defendant to purposefully avail himself of 
the activities within the forum state to ensure that a defendant 
will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of the 
unilateral activity of another party or a third person.225 Again, 
the "something more" required to assert jurisdiction over a de-
fendant is confused by the conflicting decision in Panavision. 
By simply responding to a contact initiated by an Internet 
user in California, Toeppen was neither advertising in the fo-
rum state nor evidencing an intent to serve a market in that 
state.226 Similarly, the fortuitous occurrence that Panavision's 
223. Panavision is also distinguishable from lntermatic and American Standard. 
Here, Toeppen does have a nexus between his web site and the "panavision.com" do-
main name. In both of the previous suits against Toeppen, he did not have a "legiti-
mate" nexus between the domain names and his intended use of the domain name on 
the Internet. However, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit did not discuss 
Toeppen's web site that displays aerial views of Pana, Illinois. His web site may not 
have been created with the good faith intentions that Toeppen purports, but it is fa-
cially innocent purpose should be enough to prevent the district court from haling him 
into court in a far away state. 
224. The K.C.P.L. court also focuses in the fact that many of the domain names 
registered by Toeppen are famous marks. See K.C.P.L., 1998 WL 823657 at *8. Even 
thoug Nash demanded money in return for the rights to his domain names, the 
K.C.P.L. court held that his actions were distinguishable from Toeppen's conduct be-
cause Toeppen registered famous marks, while Nash did not. See id. Evidently a de-
fendant may register "non-famous" trademarks and not be labeled as a "cyber pirate." 
The focus of the Calder effects test is to analyze the defendant's intent; therefore, the 
magnitude of the defendant's conduct should be irrelevant. 
225. See Burger King v. Rudgwicz, 471 U.S. 460, 475 (1985). 
226. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of America Bank, 796 F. Supp 1333, 1336 
(C.D. Cal. 1992); See also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (jurisdiction over defendant 
cannot rely on plaintiffs unilateral actions). 
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primary place of business is located in California, without 
more, should not serve as the basis for making Toeppen answer 
in California. Furthermore, Panavision's unilateral actions in 
contacting Toeppen, and trying to bring the domain name reg-
istration to California, does not constitute a basis for jurisdic-
tion in that state.227 
In addition, the foreseeability of causing injury in another 
state alone should not be a sufficient benchmark for exercising 
personal jurisdiction.228 Instead, a defendant must purposely 
avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum state.229 Regardless, absent evidence that Toeppen 
would or could have transferred the "panavision.com" domain 
name only to Panavision, the plaintiff has not shown that To-
eppen likely knew the injury would occur in California, thus 
the effects test is inapplicable. 230 The Ninth Circuit did not 
provide reasoning to establish the basis that Toeppen's regis-
tration of the domain name was "aimed at the forum state."2:Il 
Id. 
227. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253. 'The Court stated: 
'The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a 
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the 
forum state. 'The application of this rule will vary with the quality and nature 
of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some 
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws. 
228. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 ("Although it has been argued that foresee· 
ability of causing injury in another state should be sufficient to establish such contacts 
there when policy considerations so require, the Court has consistently held that this 
kind of foreseeability is not a 'sufficient benchmark' for exercising personal jurisdic· 
tion"). 
229. See id. 
230. In trademark law, the same mark may be registered for several different 
classes of goods. For example, the "Delta" mark is registered to Delta Airlines and 
Delta Faucet Company for different classes of goods. An individual that registers the 
"Delta" mark as a domain name would not be able to forsee which company would 
bring suit to retain the domain name. 
231. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. at 621. The district court 
assumed the truth of Panavision's allegations for purposes of deciding the summary 
judgment motion. Many Fortune 500 companies do not have domain names that iden-
tically match their trademark name. The list of Fortune 500 companies and their 
respective domain names can be found at hl.tpJLW:..\f.W glgc com/ffiOO html. 
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It would be fundamentally unfair to hale a defendant into court 
in a state where he or she had no reason to foresee ever having 
to defend oneself there. 
Recognizing that anyone could access the Florida Cybersell 
web site, the Cybersell court stated that it could not see how it 
could infer that the Cybersell (Florida corporation) purpose-
fully directed its efforts towards Arizona.?'J2 The court in 
Panavision could have drawn an equally reasonable inference 
that anyone in any state could access the site and, even if To-
eppen was a cybersquatter, that Toeppen could have sold his 
registrations to anyone willing to acquire them.233 Toeppen was 
entitled to the inference that he could have held the name or 
transferred it to some entity other than Panavision. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Panavision, the Ninth Circuit, unfortunately, added to 
the confusing state of the law regarding personal jurisdiction in 
the Internet context. The court aff"ll"lIled the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over an out of state defendant who merely 
registered a domain name using a forum state corporation's 
A list of several examples where the company name does not exactly mateh their 










United Technologies ute.com 
International Paper ipaper.com 
American Stores amstr .com 
Toys 'R' Us tru.com 
Bank of Boston Corp. bkb.com 
General Dynamics gdeb.com 
These Fortune 500 companies, such as Hewlett-Packard and General Motors, are 
presumably not "injured" or losing sales because potential customers can not fmd them 
on the Internet since their web site domain names are not identical with their corpo-
rate names. 
232. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419 ("While there is no question that anyone, any-
where could access that home page and thereby learn about the services offered, we 
cannot see how from that fact alone it can be inferred that Cybersell.FL deliberately 
directed its merchandising efforts toward Arizona residents"). 
233. For example, retail agents associated with the trademark owners, critics of the 
trademark owners or to others for whom the trademark might have some vanity value. 
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trademark. His use of this domain name had a facially reason-
able purpose, yet the court found that the harmful effects 
caused by this act on a nationwide corporation, were such that 
this individual should be forced to defend himself several thou-
sand miles from his home state. 
This decision contradicted the Ninth Circuit's own prece-
dent; that the effects test has questionable weight when ap-
plied to corporations. It also went against the holdings of other 
circuits, which point out that the effects test should not be an 
end in itself, but rather only a means to further examine the 
traditional mjnjmum contacts analysis. 
In addition, basing personal jurisdiction on the defendant's 
status as a cyber pirate cannot be acceptable since this status 
is not clearly defined. Such a distinction also has the potential 
to subject innocent website creators who inadvertently use 
trademarked words as domain names to defending themselves 
in far off forums. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's decision goes against many deci-
sions that found that merely putting an item into the stream of 
commerce was not sufficient to create personal jurisdiction. In 
the Cyberworld of the Internet, creating potentially universal 
personal jurisdiction in any forum for those who create web 
sites, and who provide the information that feeds the "Informa-
tion Superhighway," could have a chilling effect on Internet 
creativity and utility. Free exchange of information requires 
that people feel free to participate without having to defend 
their actions in far off places. The Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Panavision could have an unintended effect of limiting Internet 
discussion to those voices holding registered trademarks, at the 
expense of losing the input of innovative individuals who can-
not afford to travel thousands of miles to defend themselves. 
Scott D. Sanford-
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